Patton pushes on (what if)

[PanzerJaeger]

Please excuse the rambling nature of this post... 2 exams and little sleep have taken their toll...

True in a way, but if we're gonna count only troops that were of German quality than we would probably end not counting all other troops involved in WW2. Overall, German army was of better quality than any other involved in the WW2. Also, many of the Soviet troops even in 1945 and especially so in 1941 or 1942 were sent to the fronts without practically the basic training and many Soviet divisions were of poorer quality than Romanian divisions.

I mostly agree, although I'm not sure about the Romanian divisions versus the Russian. I would contend that they were only better in quality than the Italian divisions. () Also, Russian training increased in quality throughout the war, while that of the Eastern European allies tended to fall dramatically from their already poor state.

I do think it is important to make the distinctions, though, especially in regards to "quick and dirty" summaries of battles such as those found on Wiki - which are shoddy at best at breaking those numbers down. Minor allies can add significantly to the Axis numbers without adding anything to the combat effectiveness of army group in question, especially in the period we are discussing.

Why are Hitler's idiotic decisions excuse for every defeat and Stalin's aren't? It's often emphasized how Stalin trusted his generals unlike Hitler who interfered in every decision while both of them interfered and made disastrous decisions. The difference is that Stalin interfered gradually less and Hitler gradually more as the war went on.

I listed Hitler's interference as a factor, not an excuse, in the timeframe we are discussing (1944), and not as a comparison to Stalin's earlier interventions in Soviet Operations.

I will say that in my opinion, Hitler's interference may be weighted more in historical analysis than Stalin’s for a few reasons. Keep in mind this is just my opinion, and I'm not necessarily convinced that the imbalance you mentioned exists, as I have seen plenty of references to Stalin's meddling when describing the Red Army's operations in the early stages of the war.

First of all, while Stalin's decisions are now evidently clear to have been suicidal for his forces, at the time there was reason to be optimistic. In many of the defeats in which Stalin personally gave stand fast orders, the Soviet Union outnumbered the Germans by a significant margin and were on the defense. Remember, too, that in this early stage of the war, it was inconceivable to many in STAVKA, that such huge numbers of troops could be encircled by the relatively small mobile forces of the Wehrmacht. Sure there were people such as Zhukov who realized the situation early on, but there were plenty who disagreed. On the other hand, Hitler's interference in the later stages of the war was clearly suicidal to all. Russian capabilities were well known by that time and the standard defense against them (elastic) was in direct opposition to stand fast orders and required local freedom of operation, not orders from the Wolf's Lair hundreds of miles away.

Second, it is important to remember that Germany and Russia had very different standards for success in '41. The Wehrmacht's main goal was to instigate and win a climactic battle which would so devastate Russia that it would end the war. To that aim, they pursued the massive envelopments that characterized this period, while trying to keep casualties as low as possible. For Russia, the primary measure of success was time - not land and certainly not soldiers. Every day that passed and Moscow had not been taken, Germany crept ever closer to the perils that came with the winter and the Eastern Divisions en route from the Manchurian border.

In this light, Stalin's stand fast orders and other military bungling were not necessarily wrong. They may not have been the best use of Russian forces and certainly lost huge numbers of soldiers, but they did not actually cost the USSR any land, as it would have been lost anyway in a retreat; and more importantly they cost the Wehrmacht precious time and energy. For example, the diversion to capture Kiev may have been a spectacular success, but it cost the Axis many thousands of irreplaceable soldiers and 4 critical warm weather weeks. Also, the decisions to hold Leningrad and later Stalingrad during Case Blue, when prevailing wisdom was to avoid encirclement, were correct outright.

Conversely, it is quite difficult to make a case for any of Hitler's stand fast orders or other interventions in the later stages of the war. Unlike the USSR in '41, manpower was always at a premium for Germany, and never more so than in '44 and '45. Needless sacrificing of it for a few days or weeks time did not yield the same benefits as it did for Russia. Unlike the USSR, the loss of each trained and experienced soldier had significant repercussions on the combat effectiveness of his unit. More importantly, Hitler stripped his forces of one of the key factors that allowed them to outfight much larger Soviet formations - mobility. If the Germans were to have any chance at all in halting the massive offensives of '44, they needed the ability to first step out of the way of the hammer blow, and then use their superior coordination to strike back once the Russians had exhausted themselves. Instead, Hitler forced his troops to face the largest artillery and armored assaults in history.

Stavka members (Zhukov especially) warned Stalin that Kiev would be lost and should be abandoned because Germans would encircle the city and trap. Stalin wouldn't hear of it and removed Zhukov from his position of the Chief of Staff. Kiev was lost precisely in a way Zhukov said it would and app. 600,000 Red Army troops was lost. That's seen as great German victory because of their tactical, doctrinal, strategic or whichever superiority. At Stalingrad, Hitler forbade 6th Army to try to break out, 300,000 German soldiers were lost. That's seen as Hitler's stupidity.

Well, I don't personally consider Kiev one of the greatest German victories of the war, although I suppose technically it was the single greatest one - being the largest encirclement of troops in history. I think the battles leading up to Kiev, particularly Brody and Uman, are much more demonstrative of German doctrinal and tactical superiority than Kiev. Brody in particular was the largest tank engagement in history until Kursk, where German armored forces fought off and then destroyed a multi-pronged attack from several much larger Soviet tank corps employing the T-34 for the first time - which no German tank could counter. German skill alone was the deciding factor in the battle.

There are some differences between Kiev and Stalingrad, though, besides the differences in the size of the forces captured. The Kiev area was encircled and the troops within it destroyed by a significantly smaller German force. Considering that only around 15% of the German force was mobile, the numbers are even more dramatic. The encirclement at Stalingrad was conducted with a larger Russian force - 5 entire armies with far more mobile elements. Also, while the Soviet force at Kiev did include some spill over from previous battles, it had large amounts of fresh divisions. The German forces at Stalingrad were completely exhausted.

In hindsight, Zhukov was certainly correct, but his accurate prediction cannot discount the tactical, doctrinal, strategic or whichever superiority that contributed to the victory. Kiev was the culmination of all that Wehrmacht theorists and tacticians had been working toward, in that mastery of maneuver and agility had rendered numbers meaningless.

Stalingrad, on the other hand, yielded a more predictable outcome. Hitler ignored the lessons learned in past campaigns and squandered German troops in bitter street fighting which negated their natural advantages against the Soviets - all the while refusing the Romanians any support on the flanks. The fact that five fresh Soviet armies broke through the poorly guarded flanks and encircled a smaller and exhausted German army is not particularly stunning, and was not to the Germans commanders who tried to warn Hitler about it. Compounding his idiocy in conducting the initial battle, Hitler then refused to authorize an immediate breakout.

So while the huge loss at Kiev did certainly involve an element of poor Soviet command - Stalin's orders - the vastness of the forces enveloped still demonstrated the degree of skill the Wehrmacht and the panzer forces in particular had developed by that time. On the other hand, Stalingrad simply demonstrated that if a large enough numerical superiority could be achieved, an adequately exhausted and depleted German army could be defeated.

In a way, after '43, German army started to look more and more like the Red Army in 1941 and 1942, while after '43, Red Army started to look more like German army in 1941. Hitler sent Fuehrungoffiziers, which were practically Nazi equivalents of Party Komisars to monitor various commanders, effectively curbing any initiative that they might have had before. Fuehrungoffiziers blamed commanders for every defeat and usually relieved them of command on the spot. Every city was declared a fortress city that's to be defended to the last man etc... Every single one of those things Stalin did in 1941 and 1942 and even 1943, to a lesser degree. So, in essence, why are 1941 and 1942 seen as the period of German crushing victories because of their superiority and 1944 and 1945 are seen as the period of Soviet crushing victories because of Hitler's stupidity?

I think I addressed this earlier. Numbers play a big part, not to mention the fact that the German victories were scored against a fresh army while the Russian ones were achieved well after attrition had had a major impact on the Wehrmacht. Also Stalin’s decisions are not viewed to be as detrimental as Hitler’s.

Further, I think history distinguishes between the two periods not so much based on the victories themselves, but how they were achieved. The German victories were achieved with a level of finesse that the Russians did not quite master – which is admirable to many.

Again, why is German inferior equipment suddenly an excuse? Earlier German tanks could destroy T-34/75 if they got close or attacked it from the flank or rear. When Manstein's tanks spearheaded by brand new Panthers and Tigers got dangerously close to penetrating Soviet defenses at Kursk, Vatutin's tank army was sent to stop them. The best tank in that army was T-34/75 as 85mm variant didn't exist yet. T-34/75 couldn't penetrate frontal armour of either Panther or Tiger unless at very close range or if it ataccked their sides or rear. On the other hand, Tigers and Panthers could engage T-34/75 at several time bigger distance and they did, quite lethally. So, are we to discount entire Vatutin's tank army because it was inferior and say that Von Manstein was stopped by ghosts?

The point being that Russian armored strength was even greater than the numbers given, as many of the tanks counted as operational could not engage Russian armor at all. Remember, a T-34/76 could successfully engage a Tiger. It was at a significant disadvantage, but it was possible. Many German tanks still counted as operational at this time could not engage a T-34 at all.

If you want to count all German tanks capable of engaging Russian armor with any degree of success, we will have to include later models of the pz.III. Still, one has to remember that the German army still employed many smaller tanks such as pz.IIs, pz.38(t)s, etc for scouting and other purposes but which would never been sent into combat as they had no chance of success against Soviet armor.

True, there were instances when German managed to perform well in 1944 or even 1945, but also there are instances when Soviet managed to do the same in 1941, like Je'lna counteroffensive by Zhukov. All in all, it doesn't prove much.

I would contend that it proves much more than the Soviet victories do, considering the massive numerical imbalances involved.

I am of the opinion that Deep Operations doctrine was superior to Blitzkrieg, although I wouldn't consider either "far superior" to the other as doctrines were very similar - choose a weak spot, apply superior number of combined arms on a narrow frontage, achieve a breakthrough, move mechanized force in to exploit the gap, encircle enemy troops and stop reinforcements and move infantry and slower moving units in to mop up. Of course there were variations but that's the basic principle. Also, from what I remember reading, Tukhachevsky writings on the subject of Deep Battle featured prominently in Guderian's research material.

Deep Operations is a little too open ended for my tastes. If your enemy is not completely helpless, you end up with a hodgepodge of penetrations that are hard to maintain and supply and are more vulnerable to counterattack. With the somewhat more definite nature of Blitzkrieg and its adaptions throughout the war, you end up with those nice big encirclements that can be easier to hold. Of course as you mentioned the two are very close and a competent commander could certainly achieve large encirclements and further success using Deep Operations.

What made the Germans, in my opinion, far superior throughout the war was not just doctrines such as Blitzkrieg, Kampfgruppe, and elastic defense, but their efficiency in carrying them out.

As I mentioned before, I concur that there is nothing particularly wrong with the Deep Operations doctrine. In fact, it was far superior to most of what was being taught throughout the civilized world, including the attritional doctrines among the Western Allied and it worked great against the Japanese.

The problem for the Soviets, in my opinion, was that when they faced an enemy with any degree of mobility, their capabilities never matched what was called for in the doctrine. The history of the Eastern front in ’43, ’44, and even ‘45 is littered with examples of Soviet forces advancing too far and being cut off and destroyed – on both a small and a grand scale. (Manstein became so confident of this occurrence that it became the central tenant in the alternate plan he presented to the Kursk offensive.)

Russian forces never achieved the leadership skill, training, and coordination necessary to conduct a successful offensive based on Deep Operations unless they had massive numerical superiority, and even then they could expect to lose a large part of their lead elements to localized German tactical victories.

On the other hand, it is very difficult to find examples of German pincers being cut off and destroyed. There were of course many pockets left in the wake of Soviet offensives – some of which the Germans were able to breakout from and some of which they were not – but on the offensive the Germans were generally very proficient at keeping their lead elements both alive and effective, even deep into enemy territory. This reflected a certain degree of leadership, planning, training, and coordination that the Russians never developed. One factor almost completely missing was a sophisticated air transport system which delivered invaluable supplies to both advancing German pincers and those troops trapped in pockets.

True, but in the same way, many factors played more heavily in '41 and '42 offensives than German skill at arms. Stalin's constant intervention, the loss of irreplaceable core of command cadre in the purges (from the same book by Glants) - Of an estimated 75,000 to 80,000 officers in the armed forces, at least 30,000 were imprisoned or executed. They included three out of five marshals; all 11 deputy defense commissars; all commanders of military districts; the commanders and chiefs of staff of both the Navy and the Air Force; 14 of 16 army commanders; 60 of 67 corps commanders; 136 of 199 division commanders; 221 of 397 brigade commanders; and 50 percent of all regimental commanders. In addition to that, Red Army was caught mid-doctrines, trying to revert to something remotely similar to Deep Operations after it was practically abandoned after the Spanish Civil War and the death of Tukhachevsky. Defensive positions weren't prepared as they were moved west, most of the equipment was obsolete, new equipment, T-34s for example were few and still new, lacking trained crews, spare parts and fuel and most of all commanders who could use them effectively. Party Komisars terrorized army commanders, curbing any initiative. Stalin changed commanders of the fronts on a daily basis. In 1941 there were three different Chiefs of Staff. Massive numerical superiority in 1944 and 1945 wasn't really that massive and many soldiers in the Red Army were conscripted and sent to front without practically any training. They simply didn't have the staying power of German soldiers. Not to mention that even those soldiers who received proper training, as much as proper training was possible in the chaos that was the Red Army in '38, '39 and '40, they still lacked two years of combat experience their opponents had.

All in all, I would say German army in 1944 was in far better state than Red Army in 1941. By luck, instinct or good use of intelligence (probably by a combination of all three factors) Hitler attacked when Red Army was in its weakest state in decades. Red Army of the 30's would put up a better fight than Red Army of the '41. Basically Red Army in 1941 was no army. Yes, there were a bunch of people wearing the same clothes and they had weapons but that's where any similarity with an army ends.

I disagree almost completely with your later points. :P

Both the Russian army and the German army faced organizational issues before the war. Russia had the Purges and Germany had a little thing called WW1. It should be taken into account that the German military, too, was hamstrung until the very late thirties in much of its military development. For example, tank development lagged significantly behind other nations.

Furthermore, while the effects of the Purges certainly had a negative effect on the Russian military – those effects should not be overstated. While the administrative experience of the officers purged lost was costly, their practical battle experience was of little more value than the officers that replaced them. In fact, some old WW1 vets were replaced with fresh thinkers. Also, it should be remembered that Stalin eventually reinstated a large percentage of those dismissed during the purges.

The Red Army was still very much a competent, functioning military in ’41 – capable of conducting both defensive and offensive operations. Despite the purges, it still had highly skilled commanders such as Zhukov. It had large numbers of trained soldiers (training was much better pre-war than during the first years) and large numbers of armor and artillery, some of it better than that of the Germans. It had one of the largest air forces in the world, and a logistical system larger than that of the Germans. Also, it did have significant recent battle experience in both the victory at Khalkhin Gol, the struggles of the Winter War, and the invasion of Poland – all of which offered invaluable knowledge.

All of this is evident in battles such as Brody and others, which I referenced above, where the Soviets were able to form cohesive fighting formations and engage the enemy in offensive armored thrusts that were far more skillful than anything seen in France. The Germans outfought them, but they were hardly just a bunch of guys sitting around in uniforms waiting to be captured. I believe Axis casualty rates were higher in the East than the West almost from the start. If we were to go by your summation, neither the French nor the British had real armies either.

I just don’t think the situation is comparable to ’44. The numerical imbalances were massive, as can be seen in earlier posts in this thread, especially in armor and artillery. Not to mention that the Wehrmacht had been bled white over years of fighting, while the Red Army only grew in strength and combat effectiveness. Without a counter to Soviet Armored thrusts – ie a significant panzer reserve or artillery screen – the Germans had no chance of success in ’44. The Soviets did in ’41.