Patton pushes on (what if)

[PanzerJaeger]

I can live with that conclusion, especially as writing these things started to take way too much time . I've seen that I made some minor mistakes, with names mostly, it should have been Katukov, not Vatutin and Pavlov, not Belov, but if I tried to verify every little thing it would have literally taken me hours to write any of those posts. Overall, I wouldn't say either Red Army's or Wehrmacht's victories should be discounted, we should just take into account the shape of the opponent in both cases. The difference is in degree, as you said, and that's perfectly acceptable to me.

Indeed, but it was definitely time well spent. You certainly know your facts.

Also, I did find the quote I was looking for in Panzer Leader, regarding German defensive fortifications. Although very displeased about having to go on the defensive permanently in the East, Guderian set about trying to solidify German holdings. He says:

"Unfortunately we did not manage to carry out the whole of our Eastern programme successfully. It is true that we did succeed in building the necessary fortified lines and positions, but the indispensable garrisons and weapons were not forthcoming as a result of the catastrophic and rapid sequence of events on the invasion front in the West. The value of the fortifications built there fore remained limited. They further suffered as a result of an order by Hitler that the 'Great Defensive Line,' to which the troops were to withdraw immediately before the enemy launched its attack, was not - as the army groups and I desired - to be some 12 miles behind the normal main defensive line, but was to be build at an insufficient depth of only 1 to 3 miles back." - Guderian 371, 372.

Further he writes:

"The fortifications built on the Eastern Front had meanwhile made our line, long and far too thin as it was, yet sufficiently strong for quiet periods. We did our best to make use of the experience we had gained during the recent battles, but in so doing came up against Hitler's opposition. One essential requirement at the front was that the ordinary main line of defense - to be defended on normal occasions - must be separated from the major line of defense, which was intended to be held in the event of the Russians launching a large scale attack against any one sector. The officers at the front wished to build this major defensive line some 12 miles behind the main line of defense, to camouflage it carefully and to install a holding garrison inside it. They further wanted standing authority to withdraw the bulk of their forces into this major defensive line as soon as the Russian artillery preparation that heralded a forthcoming attack should begin, leaving only rearguards in the old main line of defense; the Russian barrage would thus be wasted, his assault, so laboriously prepared, would be fruitless and by the time he came up against our well-prepared defensive positions he could in consequence be repulsed. There can be no doubt that this theory was absolutely correct. I approved it and submitted it to Hitler. He lost his temper, saying that he refused to accept the sacrifice of 12 miles without a fight and ordered that the major defensive line be build from 1 to 2 miles behind the main line of defense. He was basing his ideas on the conditions prevailing in the First World War when he gave those nonsensical orders and no arguments could bring him to see reason." - Guderian 377.

Awesome discussion all!

There have been a few authors thrown around in this discussion. Any recommended reading on the German/Russian armies in the East?

David M. Glantz is excellent. He focuses more on the Soviets, but his books describing specific engagements are well written, thorough, and very accurate.

[Gregoshi]

Thanks Kage & PJ. Glantz has a ton of books on the subject. Now I just have to decide what aspect of the Eastern Front I want to read about first. Too...many...choices...brain...hurts.

[Sarmatian]

I think Glantz, whom you have showed appreciatian in this thread disagrees with you about Tikhvin, or Tikhvinsk-Kirishsk offensive operation as it is officially called.

You may have misunderstood me. I don't think anything in my post disagrees with what you've written.

I said Tikhvin was small scale but that was in terms of size of forces, not importance of the battle. I've said it tends to be overlooked because the battle for Moscow was happening at the same time. I've said that Finns were never really enthusiastic allies of Germany and that what was gonna happen up north depended on them and that were they committed, we might have seen some totally different scenarios, meaning it could have been very bad for the Red Army

Unless I'm mistaken, that's pretty much your point...

Now, what would happen if Soviets did lose Leningrad, Archangels and Murmansk... That's one of those big "what ifs" of the WW2. What if Yugoslavia didn't back out of the pact, allowing Germany to lauch Barbarossa in May, as it was planned, what if Hitler didn't switch panzers from AGC to AGS, what if French army in 1939 attacked Germany instead of waiting behind Maginot Line...

It would certainly hurt, although I don't think lend-lease aspect would be that important. As you've seen, I've argued that the overall impact of lend-lease is exaggerated and even so, there still was the other way to get lend-lease to USSR. Good chunk of industry was already removed from Leningrad. Soviets couldn't use manpower of Leningrad anyway. It would have been probably a great morale boost for the Wehrmacht as it would maintain their aura of invincibility. Then again, it could have given a morale boost to the Red Army, basically entire city being a martyr... Instead of all those rockets with "Remember Stalingrad" written on them, the inscription might say "Remember Leningrad"...

It would free up some additional German troops, certainly. Whether that would have been enough to change the course of the fight in the East, I really can't say...

Indeed, but it was definitely time well spent. You certainly know your facts.

Also, I did find the quote I was looking for in Panzer Leader, regarding German defensive fortifications. Although very displeased about having to go on the defensive permanently in the East, Guderian set about trying to solidify German holdings. He says:

"Unfortunately we did not manage to carry out the whole of our Eastern programme successfully. It is true that we did succeed in building the necessary fortified lines and positions, but the indispensable garrisons and weapons were not forthcoming as a result of the catastrophic and rapid sequence of events on the invasion front in the West. The value of the fortifications built there fore remained limited. They further suffered as a result of an order by Hitler that the 'Great Defensive Line,' to which the troops were to withdraw immediately before the enemy launched its attack, was not - as the army groups and I desired - to be some 12 miles behind the normal main defensive line, but was to be build at an insufficient depth of only 1 to 3 miles back." - Guderian 371, 372.

Further he writes:

"The fortifications built on the Eastern Front had meanwhile made our line, long and far too thin as it was, yet sufficiently strong for quiet periods. We did our best to make use of the experience we had gained during the recent battles, but in so doing came up against Hitler's opposition. One essential requirement at the front was that the ordinary main line of defense - to be defended on normal occasions - must be separated from the major line of defense, which was intended to be held in the event of the Russians launching a large scale attack against any one sector. The officers at the front wished to build this major defensive line some 12 miles behind the main line of defense, to camouflage it carefully and to install a holding garrison inside it. They further wanted standing authority to withdraw the bulk of their forces into this major defensive line as soon as the Russian artillery preparation that heralded a forthcoming attack should begin, leaving only rearguards in the old main line of defense; the Russian barrage would thus be wasted, his assault, so laboriously prepared, would be fruitless and by the time he came up against our well-prepared defensive positions he could in consequence be repulsed. There can be no doubt that this theory was absolutely correct. I approved it and submitted it to Hitler. He lost his temper, saying that he refused to accept the sacrifice of 12 miles without a fight and ordered that the major defensive line be build from 1 to 2 miles behind the main line of defense. He was basing his ideas on the conditions prevailing in the First World War when he gave those nonsensical orders and no arguments could bring him to see reason." - Guderian 377.

Well, Heinrici in battle of Seelow (sp?) hills showed that strategy could be useful. He made Zhukov waste his initial artillery barrage and delayed the Red Army for several days. Quite a feat since it was in April 1945, although the terrain configuration itself did a lot for him.

On the other hand, Red Army would probably adapt in some way. Maybe save most of the artillery and make a false attack, prompting Germans to withdraw, then rush in and take those position, deploy the bulk of artillery there and start pounding the second defensive line. Maybe make better coordination with the airforce - after initial artillery attack send massive amounts of CAS fighters to attack German soldiers which are now not dug in but are moving... Red Army had the complete initiative and was therefore in a superior position, it could always be one step ahead of the opponent because Wehrmacht was in a defensive stance, forced to respond to the actions of the Red Army.

Of course, if we're talking about 1944 specifically, Germany was already beaten and the best the Germans could do at that point was delay the inevitable. Nothing short of a miracle or divine intervention would stop Russians from reaching Berlin, and Germans already used up the one they had in the Seven Years' War :D

Thanks Kage & PJ. Glantz has a ton of books on the subject. Now I just have to decide what aspect of the Eastern Front I want to read about first. Too...many...choices...brain...hurts.

Maybe you could start with "When Titans Clashed". It deals with the entire conflict, 1941-1945 and is relatively broad. After that it would be easier to choose what specific part of the conflict would interest you, if any...

[Oleander Ardens]

Hello Sarmantian, do you have a source that states that the Lend-Lease amounted for only 4% of the industrial production? If yes, was it calculated? Personally I know just too good that sometimes such numbers can be very deceptive. Here I have taken the neat Wiki numbers and the numbers of Glantz. Note that the items are mosty finished goods and mostly at the very end of the value chain (aircraft, radio, trucks)

Production by country

[edit] Vehicles and ground weapons

[edit] Tanks and self-propelled guns


1. Soviet Union = 105,251 (92,595)
2. United States = 88,410 (71,067)
3. Germany = 46,857 (37,794)
4. United Kingdom = 27,896
5. Canada = 5,678
6. Japan = 2,515
7. Italy = 2,473
8. Hungary = 500

Note: Number in parenthesis equals the number of tanks and self-propelled guns equipped with main weapons of 75 mm calibre or larger. Smaller producing countries do not have this differentiation.

[edit] Artillery

Artillery includes anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons with calibres above 37 mm.

1. Soviet Union = 516,648
2. United States = 257,390
3. Germany = 159,147
4. United Kingdom = 124,877
5. Japan = 13,350
6. Canada = 10,552
7. Italy = 7,200
8. Other Commonwealth = 5,215
9. Hungary = 447

[edit] Mortars (over 60 mm)

1. Soviet Union = 200,300
2. United States = 105,055
3. United Kingdom = 102,950
4. Germany = 73,484
5. Commonwealth = 46,014

[edit] Machineguns

Machineguns do not include sub-machineguns, or machine guns used for arming aircraft.

1. United States = 2,679,840
2. Soviet Union = 1,477,400
3. Germany = 674,280
4. Japan = 380,000
5. United Kingdom = 297,336
6. Canada = 251,925
7. Other Commonwealth = 37,983
8. Hungary = 4,583

[edit] Military trucks

1. United States = 2,382,311
2. Canada = 815,729
3. United Kingdom = 480,943
4. Germany = 345,914
5. Soviet Union = 197,100
6. Japan = 165,945
7. Italy = 83,000

[edit] Aircraft

[edit] Military aircraft of all types

1. United States = 324,750
2. Germany = 189,307
3. Soviet Union = 157,261
4. United Kingdom = 131,549
5. Japan = 76,320
6. Canada = 16,431
7. Italy = 11,122
8. France (09/39 - 06/40) = 4,016
9. Other Commonwealth = 3,081
10. Hungary = 1,046
11. Romania = 1,000

[edit] Fighter aircraft

1. United States = 99,950
2. Soviet Union = 63,087
3. Germany = 55,727
4. United Kingdom = 49,422
5. Japan = 30,447
6. Italy = 4,510
7. France (09/39 - 06/40): 1,597 = 542 MS.406 + 437 D.520+ 518 MB.151+ 80 C.714 + 20 VG-33

[edit] Attack aircraft

1. Soviet Union = 37,549
2. Germany = 12,539
3. France (09/39 - 06/40) = 280

[edit] Bomber aircraft


1. United States = 97,810
2. United Kingdom = 34,689
3. Soviet Union = 21,116
4. Germany: 18,449[1] = 214 Ar 234 + 475 Do 17 + 1,366 Do 217 + 5,656 He 111 + 1,146 He 177 + 9,122 Ju 88 + 466 Ju 188 + 4 Ju 388
5. Japan = 15,117
6. Italy = 2,063
7. France (09/39 - 06/40) = 712

[edit] Transport aircraft

1. United States = 23,929
2. Soviet Union = 17,332
3. Germany = 3,079
4. Japan = 2,110
5. United Kingdom = 1,784[2]
6. Italy = 468

[edit] Training aircraft

1. United States = 57,623
2. United Kingdom = 31,864
3. Japan = 15,201
4. Germany = 11,546
5. Soviet Union = 4,061
6. Italy = 1,769

[edit] Naval ships
American Essex class aircraft carrier.

[edit] Aircraft carriers

1. United States = 22 (141)
2. Japan = 16
3. United Kingdom = 14
4. Germany = 0 None completed by the end of the war. Two were in production , Graf Zeppelin and Flugzeugträger B.
5. Italy = 0 None completed by the end of the war. One was in production , see Aquila .

Figure in parentheses indicates merchant vessels converted to Escort carriers.

[edit] Battleships

1. United States = 8
2. United Kingdom = 5
3. Italy = 3
4. Japan = 2
5. Germany = 2

[edit] Cruisers

1. United States = 48
2. United Kingdom = 32
3. Japan = 9
4. Italy = 6
5. Soviet Union = 2

[edit] Destroyers

1. United States = 349
2. United Kingdom = 240
3. Japan = 63
4. Soviet Union = 25
5. Germany = 17
6. Italy = 6

[edit] Convoy escorts
American Fletcher class destroyer.

1. United States = 420
2. United Kingdom = 413
3. Canada = 191
4. Germany = 23

[edit] Submarines

1. Germany = 1,141[3]
2. United States = 203[3]
3. Japan = 167
4. United Kingdom = 167
5. Soviet Union = 52
6. Italy = 28

[edit] Merchant tonnage

1. United States = 33,993,230
2. United Kingdom = 6,378,899
3. Japan = 4,152,361
4. Canada = 3,742,100
5. Commonwealth = 2,702,943
6. Italy = 1,469,606

[edit] Large Scale Civil Engineering Construction

[edit] Concrete bunkers and pillboxes

Estimate - uk only - 72,128,141 tonnes of steel and concrete [4]

[edit] Concrete runways

10,000,000 tonnes [5]

[edit] Materials

[edit] Coal

In millions of metric tons

1. Germany = 2,420.3
2. United States = 2,149.7
3. United Kingdom = 1,441.2
4. Soviet Union = 590.8
5. Japan = 184.5
6. Canada = 101.9
7. Italy = 16.9
8. Hungary = 6.6
9. Romania = 1.6

[edit] Iron Ore

In millions of metric tons

1. United States = 396.9
2. Germany = 240.7
3. United Kingdom = 119.2
4. Soviet Union = 71.3
5. Japan = 21.0
6. Hungary = 14.1
7. Romania = 10.8
8. Italy = 4.4
9. Canada = 3.6

See also: Swedish iron ore during World War II

[edit] Crude Oil

In millions of metric tonnes

1. United States = 833.2
2. Soviet Union = 110.6
3. United Kingdom = 90.8
4. Germany = 33.4 (including 23.4 synthetic)
5. Romania = 25.0
6. Canada = 8.4
7. Japan = 5.2
8. Hungary = 3.1

Figure 7. Lend-Lease Assistance to the Soviet Union

Lend-Lease Domestic Production

Armored vehicles 12,161 (12 %) 98,300 (7,056 US)

Guns and mortars 9,600 (2 %) 525,200

Machine guns 131,600

Combat aircraft 18,303 (15 %) 122,100
Fighters 13,857
Bombers 3,633
Transport 710
Reconnaissance 19
Training 84

Aircraft engines 14,902 (6.7 %) 222,418

Trucks and Jeeps 409,526 (55 %) 744,400

(reached Russia) 312,600 (42 %)

Explosives (tons) 325,784

Locomotives 1,860 (6.3 %) 29,524

Rail cars 11,181

Field telephones 422,000

Foodstuffs (tons) 4,281,910 (25 %) 17,127,640

Oil (POL) (tons) 2,599,000

Boots 15,000,000 pairs

BTW: Looking at the numbers it really seems that the allied cause against Stalin would not be hopeless, given decent manpower of trained soldiers.

[Sarmatian]

Hello Sarmantian, do you have a source that states that the Lend-Lease amounted for only 4% of the industrial production? If yes, was it calculated? Personally I know just too good that sometimes such numbers can be very deceptive. Here I have taken the neat Wiki numbers and the numbers of Glantz. Note that the items are mosty finished goods and mostly at the very end of the value chain (aircraft, radio, trucks)

Several authors really, Glantz included. In fact, whenever I've seen lend-lease discussed in percentages instead of numbers the figure was always around 4%. The issue here is that there are literally thousands of small stuff that don't count for much by themselves but they take up most of the army industry - clothes (summer/winter uniforms, caps, coats, belts etc...), small arms (sidearms, rifles, machine guns etc...), munition and shells (bullets for rifles, pistols, machine gunes, artillery shells, mortar shells, tank shells, grenades, bombs, mines etc...), other field equipment (tents, boats, pontoon bridges, various other pieces of engineering equipment, barricades, barbed wire, tank obstacles etc...), medical equipment, spare parts and so on...

The number of those things built wouldn't measure in thousands or even tens of thousands but in tens or hundreds of millions, for things like bullets and artillery shells. So, 4% all together makes sense for me.

On the other hand, worth of lend-lease is not just in its scale. Some things may have been more critical than others, depending on when they arrived, did the USSR have the means or the technology to produce them etc... Unfortunately, to really assess it, one would have to look at technology available in the USSR, their production capacity for various piece of equipment, rare materials production, their supporting industries (for example, the state of chemical industries) and I don't have the time, resources or desire to do that.

So, maybe those field 400,000+ field telephones, although insignificant in their worth, were more valuable than those 400,000+ motor vehicles, because Soviets didn't have the means to produce them so quickly in such quantity. Foodstuffs may have been invaluable, even though their actual worth would make less than 1% of lend-lease worth.

Then again, some of the stuff delivered through lend-lease, especially in the beginning, was plainly and simply junk. What could the Red Army do with Lees and Stuarts? Dismantle them and use as scrap metal. They quality was awful, Russians would than have to adapt their factories to produce shells for them, spare parts, to worry about skilled mechanics who would know to repair them etc... Sometimes Russian petrol didn't work well on American motors. Equipment like that was more trouble than it was worth, in practical sense.

All in all, lend-lease, although useful, wasn't nearly as instrumental as often portrayed IMHO, for several reasons:

1) It amounted only 4%
2) Bulk of it arrived not when it was most needed but when war was practically decided already
3) A good deal of stuff that arrived in the most crucial first period of the war was either of questionable quality or junk outright

BTW: Looking at the numbers it really seems that the allied cause against Stalin would not be hopeless, given decent manpower of trained soldiers.

In my opinion, armour and artillery would be more useful in a European war than navy or airforce and that's where Soviets were ahead of western Allies. Strong communist organizations in various western countries (first and foremost France and Italy) would make Allied war effort that much harder. Industrial capacity, where western Allies would have the advantage is in the US, so in order to deploy a tank to the front line after it's produced, you have to transport it from factory to a port, load it on a ship, transport it across the Atlantic, unload it in a port and then transport it to the front line most probably by train. It would take weeks (not counting terrible state of ports in western Europe at that time and possibility of sabotage by strong communist movements). In the case of the Soviets, when a tank is produced it would be put on a train and deployed to the front line in matter of days.

Red Army was of better quality and more experienced than US and British - Eastern Front has seen more action than all other theaters combined. Russian commanders were better than their western counterparts. With all due respect to Patton, Bradley, Monty, Mac they just couldn't compare to Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Rokossovsky, Konev. In the case of hypothetical Patton's push, I think the Red Army would have been stopped by the sea and not by the allies...

[Seamus Fermanagh]

BTW: Looking at the numbers it really seems that the allied cause against Stalin would not be hopeless, given decent manpower of trained soldiers.

That would have been a problem for the West. England was near the bottom of the barrel for manpower, a fact that had been affecting their fighting style from 1944 on. The USA had numerous more warm bodies, but had adopted a policy of field far fewer infantry units than might have been fielded at a maximum effort. France had few regulars and other formerly occupied areas were fielding even fewer trained units.

What I don't really know is how close were the Soviets to the bottom of the barrell. Obviously, their population has never really recovered from the Stalin era, but I'm not sure that means they could not have fielded enough replacements to keep that large and well-equipped force they had in 1945 in the field.

[Oleander Ardens]

On the other hand, worth of lend-lease is not just in its scale. Some things may have been more critical than others, depending on when they arrived, did the USSR have the means or the technology to produce them etc... Unfortunately, to really assess it, one would have to look at technology available in the USSR, their production capacity for various piece of equipment, rare materials production, their supporting industries (for example, the state of chemical industries) and I don't have the time, resources or desire to do that.

A good look at the goods seems to support mostly this view. Personally I don't think that the Lees and Stuarts were bad for the timeframe. We are talking here about 1941 and 1942, where the need for tanks was quite desperate in the Sovietunion. The Lee outclassed the MI, MII and was overall in the league of the MIII and MIV - that the preception was not overwhelming is due to the fact that the T-34 was just such though yard stick. The Stuart was still a lot better than the MI and MII and was good design, even if too light for late 1942 and 1943.

Overall I would say that the impact was a lot higher than the 4%, especially since quite some of it arrived when the Sovietunion needed it most and it where often critical goods and components. The relative impact might have been up to 15% - we wil never know.

What I don't really know is how close were the Soviets to the bottom of the barrell. Obviously, their population has never really recovered from the Stalin era, but I'm not sure that means they could not have fielded enough replacements to keep that large and well-equipped force they had in 1945 in the field.

Glantz wrote that in 1944 the Red Army was nearing the bottom of manpower. Given the immense military and civilian losses of the Sovietunion and of some conquered satellites this is all too understandable. A war of attrition between the "Soviet" alliance and the Western allies would most likely been won by the latter. But given the great relative advantage on the field IIRC at least 2-1 in manpower and also in material it is hard to know if to which extent the greater ressources of the West could have been brought to bear.