Re: Patton pushes on (what if)
I don’t necessarily disagree, although Soviet training gradually improved with their situation. What I’m saying is that the same situation was the case with the Eastern European Axis nations, only in reverse. By ’44, they’re divisions were near worthless, whereas most Russian divisions, especially those leading offensive operations, were of much better quality.Originally Posted by Sarmatian
Yes I love Glantz. I (think) I have all of his published works. His Operation Mars was eye-opening the first time I read it. I was not questioning your numbers in particular, but just making a general statement – as I referenced Wiki in my first response to your initial post as I did not have access to my books and was surprised at how different the numbers they gave were in comparison to what I remembered them to be. I then realized that they lumped all the Axis soldiers together, which is somewhat misleading.The numbers I used were not from wiki but by Glantz. I would thoroughly recommend him as a reading - by far the most complete and most accurate account of the Red Army during the WW2 and interwar period, filled with tables and numbers. He stayed clear of practically all questionable sources and made good use of the new and/or previously unavailable sources.
Stalin’s meddling can only be said to be disastrous in ’41. Even in ’42, the decisions to hold fast in Leningrad and Stalingrad can be seen as prescient. Stalin may have brought the Red Army to the brink, but Hitler brought the Wehrmacht past it and into oblivion.In general, I'd say Stalin's meddling was far disastrous than Hitler's. I'm speaking of Stalin's meddling not just during the WW2 but also several years before. While Hitler's mistakes merely sped up the inevitable, Stalin's brought the Red Army on the brink of defeat. In just 4 years (1937-1941) he managed to totally mess up what used to be strongest, largest and most advanced army in the world in the 1930's.
Stalin has had several of warnings about Kiev, not just from Zhukov, but also from Kruschev and Budenny and from the Chief of Staff of Southwestern Front Tupikov.
Additionally, until November '41 and report from Richard Sorge that Japan won't attack for sure for another year, Far Eastern armies weren't supposed to be touched.
There are reports of Stalin's meddling but they were never as numerous as reports about Hitler's. There are several reasons for that. First, practically all we knew about the Eastern Front, until 1990's, came from the German side. Second, Red Army won, so there was much less desire to search for mistakes and who was responsible for them, especially outside Soviet Union. Third, some German commanders found it a convenient excuse for their failures. Fourth, Hitler was dead so he couldn't object while Stalin was very much alive and kicking.
If we look at the war on a broader scale, Hitler’s poor decisions can be seen to have led directly to the failure in the East and beyond. Apart from the hundreds of small and even large orders he issued that can only be seen as idiotic, he systematically squandered the three major chances the Germans had to bring the war to a favorable conclusion – the three summer offensives of ’41, ’42, and ‘43.
First, the massive successes in ’41 hide the fact that Hitler was constantly moving armies around at his discretion even then. His decision to break apart Army Group Center and take Kiev instead of advancing on Moscow, “for the grain” was catastrophic in its repercussions. As we have already discussed, the Russians lost most of their armored and mobile forces during the failed offensives at Brody, and thus the forces around Kiev were large but would have presented little real threat to a drive towards Moscow by AGC. I believe such a drive would have secured Moscow.
The second major screw up was of course Case Blue. Hitler’s decisions were ruinous on both the strategic and tactical level. Strategically, his insistence on capturing the Caucus oil fields was a needless diversion. Sure it would have been nice to secure the oil and deny the Black Sea to the Russians, but Germany was in a very precarious position even in ’42 and needed to go for the proverbial jugular. This was well known to the German leadership. Tactically, his meddling was even more critical. Even on the approach to Stalingrad, he infuriated top leadership by constantly moving armies around with no understanding of the logistics involved. I already discussed the direct effects his orders had once the city was reached.
Finally, we are left with Kursk in ’43. Now, I know I am in the minority in thinking that the war could have been won at all in ’43. It has been discussed here before and I don’t think it is worth going into again here. Regardless, I think it is undeniable that Hitler’s constant delays and insistence on attacking such well defended area went against everything the Germans knew to be correct in achieving a decisive battle and squandered the last major offensive capabilities of the Wehrmacht.
I agree. At that point, though, an orderly withdrawal and a more organized defense would have yielded little meaningful territory and saved valuable troops and resources.Indeed, we've seen time and again in war that sometimes stubborn resilience and opposition will do more than elaborate plans by experts.
Even Hitler's stand fast orders proved correct sometimes, like during December '41 Moscow counter-offensive. After the initial success, Stalin (again against the advice of his generals) wanted to broaden and expand the offensive. Zhukov and other experienced commanders knew that offensive was based on fresh troops from the Far East and limited number of skiers, tanks and cavalry that were rapidly losing their strength and outrunning their logistical tail.
Yes I am aware of this information. I was using the T-34 as a standard reference point as it was the most common used against German armored forces in the battles we’re discussing. The light tanks you discuss were used in the infantry support role by this time.Actually it wasn't. You're mistaken since you presume to T-34/76 formed the mainstay of Soviet tanks, which is as far from truth as it gets. In June '41, T-34's made up less than 4% and KV's formed less than 2% of all Soviet tanks (they were new and unreliable, most of them were sent near the border with Germany, without trained crews, spare parts and often ammunition). The rest were T-26's and various version of BT's. Those two models were on par, even slightly worse than Panzer II and III and seriously undergunned and underarmoured compared to Panzer IV, even before high velocity gun was mounted on it. Soviets produced a lot of light tanks in during the war, the most important reason is lend-lease probably. As various motor vehicles were arriving from the US, many factories switched to light tanks. They couldn't switch to medium and heavy because that required a good degree of specialization. In fact, only 5 or 6 factories could produce T-34's in the USSR and only 3 of them produced a significant numbers (the rest produced between 500-1500 T-34 during the entire war). Before German invasion, all T-34's were made in Kharkov. That factory had to be dismantled and sent behind the Urals to Nizhniy Tagil when it became clear that Germans would take Kharkov. Other factory capable of producing T-34 in 1941 was Kirov factory in Leningrad, also moved to the east. Neither of them started production before 1942 and both had problems with workers, there weren't enough of them and they weren't sufficiently skilled, so T-34 produced at the beginning of 1942 were few and of poor quality. Until mid-1942, Red Army had to make the most of several hundred T-34 produced in Kharkov before relocation. As 1942 went on the situation gradually improved but T-34's didn't appear in significant numbers until 1943. Even in 1943, T-34's and KV's together didn't make more than half of Soviet tanks, the other half being made up of light reconnaissance tanks, T-50, T-60 or T-70, probably even some T-26's and BT's that left over. Russians, like Germans found out that light tanks were becoming obsolete increasingly fast, even for scouting purposes and they were often relegated to towing artillery. In 1945 T-34's (both 76 and 85 variants) made up 55% of all Soviet tanks
Also, a few additional things should be taken into consideration to get a full picture of the armored forces involved.
First of all, IIRC, the T-34 variants made up over 50% of all Russian AFVs, not just what are traditionally considered tanks, ie turreted vehicles. The originator of that stat incorrectly labeled it. This is significant as it includes many more vehicles including all of the SU- type assault guns. Regardless, the T-34 was not the only competent Russian tank. On the contrary, the Russians had large numbers of KV-1 and, by the time we’re discussing, IS-2s – which were used in breakthrough roles in Bagration and easily outgunned everything the Germans had.
Second, one has to acknowledge the gross numbers involved here. The Russians built nearly 60,000 T-34s during the war alone, and IIRC, around 23,000 of them the 85mm variant. At the time we are discussing, the Germans had a grand total of around 300 Panthers operational in the East, while Russian production of T-34s alone was well over 1000 per month.
No matter how you frame it, the differences in armor and artillery were staggering.
Yes I agree with you on that.You're right, actually. It really wasn't so much about the doctrines but the ability to carry them out. The basic concept behind Blitzkrieg or Deep Operations wasn't that hard to grasp. Even people whose I.Q. was measured in two figures could do it but there were certain preconditions that had to be met - enough technologically advanced mobile forces (tanks, mechanized and motorized infantry), sufficiently trained and experienced troops and, most importantly, commanders skilled enough to perform it, from high-ups such as generals down to captains on the field of battle. So, even though there were some local applications of the concept within the Allies, Patton for example, they simply didn't have the skilled enough troops or commanders to perform it on a large scale, just like Soviets weren't able to do it before 1944 properly. There were occasional flashes of it in 1941 and 1942 that became more and more frequent but offensives in the true spirit of Deep Operation had to wait until 1944 and 1945.
Also, maybe the most important reason for allies not to try hard to adopt it was because they had the luxury of time and by using superior firepower they could get the job done. It took more time and less human casualties but Allies had all the time in the world. Sure it presented problems sometimes but considering their situation it was a logical decision.
Again, I completely disagree about AGC. It was hardly what I would call “in tact”. It had in no way recovered from the Smolensk battles the previous August – in manpower or material. At a time when Russian divisions all along the front were being bolstered by new men and equipment, AGC could look forward to little in terms of reinforcements. And as you stated, significant forces were removed directly before the battle. These forces included a large part of their artillery and most of their tanks. This, in effect, left AGC without a mobile reserve and utterly helpless against the Soviets. I'm not even going to get into the huge partisan uprising that Orleander touched on...There are plenty of examples of large scale Deep Operation being performed with near perfection. Operation Bagration immediately comes to mind. It was performed against AG Center. That army group was practically intact, although it weakened to reinforce AG South but itself didn't see any large scale combat for quite some time. There was more than enough time to prepare defenses, something Soviet didn't usually have the time to do in 1941 and even sometimes in 1942.
Also, Guderian dismissed the defensive works you mention in Panzer Leader, although I cannot remember why exactly. I will look it up when I get home and edit it in.
I don’t necessarily disagree with any of this. My overarching point is that being massively outnumbered and with a total ’44 Eastern Front armored force numbering in the low hundreds at best, the Germans did not have the ability to seriously contest the offensives we’re discussing; and the Russian successes, while admirable, do not really speak much to their fighting skill in comparison to the Germans at their height. It is surprising that the Russians took so many hundreds of thousands of casualties at all at this stage of the war.The sheer scale preparations is mind boggling, as is the deception that they would attack in the south. Usually Soviet offensives in that period almost always caught Wehrmacht by surprise. Even when Germans found out about the offensive they usually underestimated Soviet capabilities and that was not just bad commanders. After Kursk, Manstein was certain that Soviets were badly hurt and that they would have to spend some time licking their wounds. He didn't expect any large Soviet offensives for quite some time. He must have been really taken off guard when Soviet offensive started practically immediately. German army usually didn't know the scale of Soviet preparations or the size of the force assembled until it hit them and then it was usually too late to make adjustments. Russian Maskirovka proved its worth time and time again.
Furthermore, German sources often didn't grasp correctly what was happening. They treated all offensives separately. In truth, Operation Bagration was just a part of general offensive that was planned. The most important part but only a part. That general offensive consisted of Karelian Isthmus - 10 June, Bagration - 22 June, Lvov-Sandomierz - 13 July, Lublin-Brest 18 July, and lassy-Kishinev 20 August. It involved planning and organizing millions of troops, millions pieces of various equipment in a theater that stretched from Finland to Romania. Wehrmacht was pushed back, lost its best troops and lost two important minor allies. In addition, German irreplaceable losses were significantly higher that Soviet.
The Germans did not have qualitative superiority in tanks even from the outset and certainly not in ’42. We shouldn’t forget how much of the Panzer forces were made up of pz.IIs and lesser vehicles at that time. Also, while the Luftwaffe certainly dominated, their control was never "undisputed", and in fact their numbers too small to effectively cover the entire front. German qualitative superiority was in training, doctrine, etc.There are, if you choose to look for it. You won't find that many for several reasons - in 1941 and 1942 Germans still had qualitative superiority in tanks, as I explained how problematic production of T-34 was, and often numerical superiority. Wehrmacht also had undisputed air superiority at the time. Red Army lacked tanks, airplanes, artillery, trained troops and skilled commanders in 1941 and for the most of 1942. In that period, Germans still had enough reserves to counter-attack. In the later stages of the war, Germans practically didn't make anything remotely similar to a serious offensive so it was naturally hard for the Red Army to cut them off. They mostly limited themselves to tactical withdrawals and small scale counter-offensives, with few exceptions.
From the start, the Red Army actually had a far larger armored force (around 3000 tanks versus well over 10,000), air force(4000 planes versus 11,000), and trained contingent of soldiers. These machines were not as worthless as you suggest, especially their tanks. They simply lost them in battle. Their losses in ’41 of tanks and airplanes both reached over 20,000 each and many millions of men.
Also, the Germans made two large offensives in ’43, neither of which saw the slicing and dicing of forward elements that I described during the ’44 offensives.
That is a great write up, and I don’t have any major issues with your facts. I just think you’re overlooking some of the positive factors I mentioned earlier. The Red Army certainly had issues, but it was a functioning, competent military force… arguably better than the Western Allies. It fought hard from the beginning, launching several large scale counter-attacks involving large armored forces on broad fronts. To discount the early German victories so completely ignores the skill in which they were achieved – against superior numbers on defense.I thought you would :D.
It is actually impossible to overstate how pathetic Red Army was in 1941, especially its defenses in Belorussia and Ukraine. To understand it, we have to go back to WW1.
During the Russian civil war, Red Army fought not just the White Army but also had to fight off Polish invasion and several intervention forces than landed in Russia - Brits and Americans in Archangels and Murmansk, French in Crimea and Caucasus, Czech veterans that took control of Trans-Siberian railroad and cut off Russian Far East where Japanese and Americans roamed at will. Red Army was outnumbered and had to cover vast amounts of land. That war was much more mobile than the one in the west. Red Army had to end the battles quickly and with minimal losses. For that purpose brilliant minds like Tukhachevsky emphasized the strategy from which Deep Battle and Deep Operation doctrines were created - use of mobile forces to penetrate defences, in that time it was usually cavalry, armoured cars and armoured trains where applicable, and to continue exploitation far into enemy rear, never allow him to form a new defensive line or regroup. You see that its practically the same doctrine applied by the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in WW2, only with WW1 weapons. There were similar lines of thought in all major armies of the world but only in the Soviet Union that doctrine received official support and was codified as army doctrine in the manual of 1936. I assume you know how much difficulties Manstein and Guderian had when they tried to push their plan for attack on France, not just by Hitler but also by other senior commanders like Halder.
In the thirties Soviet adopted tank as the main weapon for such a doctrine. The first doubts begin to appear after the Spanish Civil War. Tanks of the time still weren't advanced enough, Soviets had problems of coordinating with Spanish infantry, that infantry was of poorer quality than the Soviet etc... All in all, tanks didn't perform as well as they should, but instead of identifying the correct reasons, committee set up to investigate it came to the wrong conclusion. That conclusion was also politically motivated as it was in the same time frame when Purges began. Tukhachevsky and his "faction" was purged, which incidentally involved majority of more open minded officers, leaving half-idiots like Voroshilov in charge of the army. One of the few Tukhachevsky disciples that survived was Zhukov, most importantly because he was relatively young and in the Far East at the moment. In general Far Eastern armies and their commanders weren't touched because they were too far to have any influence on politics and because of growing threat of Japan. Zhukov also had more prestige after Khalkin Gol. Although Khalkin Gol in 1939 showed what Deep Operations doctrine when performed by skilled troops and competent commander was capable of, it wasn't enough to vindicate it. Red Army deteriorated in a much worse fighting force than it was in the mid 1930's. It lost half of almost all officers in the army. What vindicated Deep Operations ironically was Wehrmacht's success in France and the Low Countries and partially it's relatively good application in the later stages of Winter War under Timoshenko.
So, in 1940, Red Army started another very slow, reorganization to make itself more similar to the mid 1930's and Wehrmacht. Soviets expected the reorganization to be finished in 1942. Also, under growing threat of the Germany, Soviets for the first time in a long time started looking at defense. In January 1940 two war games were held, practicing both defense and counter-attack. In the first Zhukov led the attack (enemy) while Belov led the defensive (Soviet) forces. Defensive forces were thoroughly beaten, prompting the Red Army to rethink its defenses. So another reorganization was started.
Lack of skilled officers of course slowed down those reforms. How serious was this lack after the purges show the example of then major later general Biriuzov, who had to assume command of his division because 4 higher officers were either killed or imprisoned. That position required at least three ranks and 10 years more experience than he had at the time.
Furthermore, after the purges, hierarchy in the Red Army was so complicated and huge that commanders often didn't know what to do and who to listen to. That was a part of Stalin's paranoid attempt to control totally every part of the Red Army. Orders were given in sealed envelopes that weren't to be opened unless several officers and political komisars were present, supply depots were sealed of until given specific orders from Moscow etc... In the chaos of the initial German attack many officers were dead so young and inexperienced officers were fearful of opening up the envelopes because they knew what can happen to them. Sure there were some commanders who showed initiative, like Rokossovsky, who refused to wait for the missing officers and practically stormed the depot and disarmed the guards who refused to allow him access, but that was the exception rather then the norm. Also Soviet troops were deployed without any logic. Forward positions were thinly manned not to provoke the Germans. The communications were in breakdown, partly because of German skillful disruption of communication line and partly of the impossible communication and command structure added to the confusion. Troops were given contradicting orders by various officers and Stavka couldn't get accurate information and assessments from forward position. Commanders were simply fearful of reporting just how terrible the situation was. That resulted in Stavka giving orders that were impossible to execute, for example an order to advance given to several division which were to be supported by several more. Problems those divisions that were supposed to provide support didn't exist anymore except on paper. That spelled certain doom for other division. In general, because of not knowing the situation Stavka and Stalin insisted on performing the counter-attack as planned. Of course it was impossible under the circumstances. Many forward supply depots were already taken by the Wehrmacht, there weren't enough supplies, ammo, shells, tanks, artillery and men to do it. Unfortunately, most commanders, knowing what may happen if they don't execute the orders simply started attacking allowing Germans to inflict massive casualties and to capture unimaginable amounts of enemy troops, equipment and supplies. There were some, again most famous example being Rokossovsky who retreated and saved what he could save but it was again the exception. Stavka, after seeing the disaster started to send representatives to bring back correct reports from the fronts. Indeed, Zhukov and Vasilevsky spent a good portion of the '41 just going back and forth from front to Stavka, for the only purpose .
Red Army lost huge amounts of equipment and weapons and their best troops. It lost majority of T-34 tanks, a huge number of airplanes, supplies, artillery, ammunition. That prompted another reorganization as Nazi advance continued. Tanks were no longer plentiful enough to form separate mechanized or tank corps, especially anything remotely similar to German Panzer Armies. They were relegated again to supporting roles. There was severe shortage of skilled commanders, mostly due to the Purge but German attack didn't help either, shortage of trained soldiers, shortage of tanks, airplanes and artillery. Under those circumstances, Deep Operations were off the table, as Zhukov, Vasilevsky and other Stavka members correctly assessed. On purpose, they brought back the Red Army to a far more primitive state than it was, using simply weight of numbers to wear enemy down and slow him down until the relocated industry starts producing again. Few skilled troops were put under competent commanders and organized into shock troops and given what was left of good equipment. The occasional glimpses of well executed delaying actions and counter-attacks in 1941 were performed by these troops. Zhukov and other leaders of the Red Army knew they had to wait until relocated factories produce enough weapons and equipment and until new soldiers acquire experoence and commanders mature enough to perform Deep Operations properly. That was the basic principle behind practically any decision by the leadership of Red Army until mid 1942. The occasional counter-attacks and counter-offensives were performed to slow down the Wehrmacht, rather than to regain huge swaths of territory, although Stalin often intervened in that regard.
I fear we're starting to go in circles. You feel the Russians were at their weakest in '41 and thus the German victories should be discounted, while I feel the Germans were at their weakest in '44 and thus the Russian victories should be discounted. Both positions are essentially valid to some extent, with the difference being in degree (I of course feel mine is more valid than yours :P). I feel the Russians in '41 were in a far better position in terms of manpower, armor, artillery, planes, freshness, logistics, and all the other factors I've mentioned than the Germans were in '44, thus making the German victories more impressive.
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. I've seen that I made some minor mistakes, with names mostly, it should have been Katukov, not Vatutin and Pavlov, not Belov, but if I tried to verify every little thing it would have literally taken me hours to write any of those posts. Overall, I wouldn't say either Red Army's or Wehrmacht's victories should be discounted, we should just take into account the shape of the opponent in both cases. The difference is in degree, as you said, and that's perfectly acceptable to me.
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