Multiculturalism is dead

[Sasaki Kojiro]

It isn't beside the point, this IS my point. You are consistently trying to talk about something else.

Your point is something that is irrelevant? I don't think you mean that. Talk of mutually agreed arbiters (sounds like a person) and giant rulers in the sky is what's beside the point. Their lack of existence is what's beside the point, because they are not required for us to be able to say that something is wrong. All we need is an understanding of language, reasoning ability, and human feelings.

1) someone betrays us out of meanness, we have a human feeling about it
2) We understand what the word "wrong" means, because we understand how words get meanings and know that the definitions can't be made up by someone with no regard to that
3) We see that given the meaning of wrong and how we felt earlier, that person was wrong and we would be too if we did it

Fill in all of the other things that all of the non-sociopathic people with intact reasoning skills and an understanding of language agree on...eg killing our children for fun.

btw, as a pre-posting this note, my sincere belief is that you are simply using language incorrectly, nothing about sociopathy or reasoning skills. You can see how our disagreement stems from you defining morality differently. Yours seems to be "things taught by a childs parents" while mine generally follows the above framework. I think even rules that are told to children they learn through that experience. Don't you? Don't you think you have the ability to break away from a cultural rule that offends your senses and reason?

1 is wrong if you can provide him with evidence to counter his reasoning that jews were "the problem", but it would not obviate his underlying anti-semitism. You would not counter his anti-semitism, I think that animosity runs deaper than macro-economic explanations.

The point was simply that some moral conclusions are based on facts about the world that even you would agree can be wrong...and that people will often stop believing their conclusion in that case. You were painting with too broad a brush.

My point is that while we may have the moral fact that the holocaust was "wrong", others didn't -and don't. Why? Simply because they have a different moral scale or valuation -that could be to do with acceptance of the methods of genocide for use against a perceived enemy, or anti-semitism. This is what makes it impossible to assume that morality is uniform accross cultures. While you've picked an extreme example, I'm sure cultures could and have existed where murdering children for fun is acceptable.

I'm also not saying that everything is ok to me as long as its cultural! Rather, while I or you might disagree with something, it could well be ok to someone else because their culture tolerates or values it. Furthermore, because that agreement/disagreement is based on culturaly determined values, it is not a matter where there is an absolute measure of truth to either position -so neither party is legitimised in simply saying that the other is "wrong".

But some of them are wrong. You are claiming that people (including you) can't be wrong about these things. But all you offer as an argument is repetition of the claim that they disagree, in gussied up language. You equivocate a lot, for example:

"I'm sure cultures have existed where murdering children for fun is acceptable"

Disregarding the fact that this is a bizarre claim to start with...it would never have been acceptable. Accepted is the word you are looking for--it just states a fact about how people treated it. The word you used says that not only did they treat it that way, they were not wrong to do so.

You say that moral facts are things that someone can "have", but would be more appropriate for beliefs. Facts are something you know. Two people can have contradictory beliefs but they can't know contradictory facts.

You talk about "different moral scales" which implies equal validity (like celsius vs fahrenheit or something) when in fact all we have again is disagreement.

You say we can't assume that "morality is uniform across cultures" but here you are using morality in the descriptive sense--all you are saying once again is that people disagree. This says nothing about morality in the prescriptive sense.

You say it could be "ok to someone else...because their culture values it" which implies that it is alright for them to believe it, but all you say is that they do in fact believe it.

Oh and one whopper of a falsehood at the end where you claim the disagreement is based on cultural values. How on earth do you think our conception of morality has changed so drastically over time? It's because we base it on our feelings and reasoning.

Basically at this point I'm just going to say, believe whatever it is you want to believe but talk about it plain language. Say "culture A believes one thing and culture B believes another" ok? And then if you want to argue that neither can be right, do so, don't fiddle with the English language to avoid it. Morality is something about which there are no facts, this is a claim you are making. Widespread disagreement is not evidence that there are no facts. You have to explain why words don't mean what the fluent speakers of the language say they mean--how they have a secret philosophical true meaning. I hope at least that even though you still disagree you can get that you aren't really arguing, just stating basics with a heavy dose of implication.

At least then our posts will be shorter

In the case of the holocaust, don't you think the victor has set the moral argument, and that had the victor been different, our views on the holocaust and Adolf might be rather different than despisal?

Speak for yourself

They would have to have a hardcore indoctrination program to achieve a significant amount of people around the world believing what they did wasn't wrong. You have a scary view of the power of culture over the human mind. Are my views about the hiroshima bombings set by the fact that the US was on the winning side? How about the bombings of dresden? Japanese internment camps? How does the world feel about that today?

[al Roumi]

WARNING! WALL OF TEXT

Your point is something that is irrelevant? I don't think you mean that. Talk of mutually agreed arbiters (sounds like a person) and giant rulers in the sky is what's beside the point. Their lack of existence is what's beside the point, because they are not required for us to be able to say that something is wrong. All we need is an understanding of language, reasoning ability, and human feelings.

There is cross cultural difference in reasoning. An absolute or impartial means of measurement is needed to ensure equal understanding across cultural divides. Otherwise, without a mutually understood and appreciated scale or set of rules, people just talk past each other (as I suspect we have been doing for a good while now).

1) someone betrays us out of meanness, we have a human feeling about it
2) We understand what the word "wrong" means, because we understand how words get meanings and know that the definitions can't be made up by someone with no regard to that
3) We see that given the meaning of wrong and how we felt earlier, that person was wrong and we would be too if we did it

Fill in all of the other things that all of the non-sociopathic people with intact reasoning skills and an understanding of language agree on...eg killing our children for fun.

btw, as a pre-posting this note, my sincere belief is that you are simply using language incorrectly, nothing about sociopathy or reasoning skills. You can see how our disagreement stems from you defining morality differently. Yours seems to be "things taught by a childs parents" while mine generally follows the above framework. I think even rules that are told to children they learn through that experience. Don't you? Don't you think you have the ability to break away from a cultural rule that offends your senses and reason?

Yes and no, you are talking about harm, which is not always a determinant of cultural value. There are people oppressed in any society, they feel harm every day, their culture still accepts it –even perpetuates it. The individual who even feels harmed will often also accept it because it is the norm in their culture.

The point was simply that some moral conclusions are based on facts about the world that even you would agree can be wrong...and that people will often stop believing their conclusion in that case. You were painting with too broad a brush.

I’m sorry to be the punctilious but you’re not setting a great example to follow. This “broad brush” is a continuation of your own strokes, I was following your own example –or more accurately, Louis’.

But some of them are wrong. You are claiming that people (including you) can't be wrong about these things. But all you offer as an argument is repetition of the claim that they disagree, in gussied up language. You equivocate a lot, for example:

"I'm sure cultures have existed where murdering children for fun is acceptable"

Disregarding the fact that this is a bizarre claim to start with...it would never have been acceptable. Accepted is the word you are looking for--it just states a fact about how people treated it.

Acceptable [behaviour] – to that culture. 50 points to Sasaki.

When you say “some of them are wrong”, you mean that YOU think some of them are wrong. That does not make them wrong in a universal sense, just because you say they are.

The word you used says that not only did they treat it that way, they were not wrong to do so.

EXACTLY. Human societies can and do include a massive range of values and behaviors which can, when contrasted, appear utterly bizarre to one another. Yet, each will be “right” or accepted by its own culture, while denigrated by the other. Who is to say which one is more right than the other? We in the modern West think slavery is wrong, yet it was an integral part of many societies and cultures for eons. We can call it wrong all we like, contemporaries would no doubt not share such views. Please don’t fall for the hubris that we are better than our predecessors, different –yes.

You say that moral facts are things that someone can "have", but would be more appropriate for beliefs. Facts are something you know. Two people can have contradictory beliefs but they can't know contradictory facts.

You talk about "different moral scales" which implies equal validity (like celsius vs fahrenheit or something) when in fact all we have again is disagreement.

Disagreement, based on contrary cultural beliefs is rarely zero sum. This is why I am banging on about different moral scales, as two such scales (as with Celsius and Fahrenheit) will each measure the same behavior (temperature) with different but confusable outcomes, i.e. 30 degrees –which as you’ll agree means something quite different in Celsius than in Fahrenheit. The difference of opinion is caused by how each “scale” or culture interprets the behavior –the analogy being the equations at the heart of each scale and the interplay of values held by given cultures.

You say we can't assume that "morality is uniform across cultures" but here you are using morality in the descriptive sense--all you are saying once again is that people disagree. This says nothing about morality in the prescriptive sense.

By the “prescriptive sense”, do you mean a culturally prescribed value (which would be, to all intents and purposes identical to a culturally derived value) or a culture prescribing a value on others?

You say it could be "ok to someone else...because their culture values it" which implies that it is alright for them to believe it, but all you say is that they do in fact believe it.

What I am saying is that they are entitled to believe whatever they do, that no other culture is independently certifiable as better or worse than another, and so no culture has the legitimacy (beyond that which it awards itself) to accuse another of wrong doing/immorality.

Oh and one whopper of a falsehood at the end where you claim the disagreement is based on cultural values. How on earth do you think our conception of morality has changed so drastically over time? It's because we base it on our feelings and reasoning.

So you are trying to say that morality is a personal thing, determined by an individual’s feeling and reasoning? I have to agree with this to an extent, but I think you are, and you show it elsewhere, unaware or blind to the effect of the wider culture of which you are a member. You would have to be a hermit for your morality and values to be purely defined by personal experience. Do you not think your culture, embodied by people around you, have shaped your own morals and values in any way?

Basically at this point I'm just going to say, believe whatever it is you want to believe but talk about it plain language. Say "culture A believes one thing and culture B believes another" ok? And then if you want to argue that neither can be right, do so, don't fiddle with the English language to avoid it. Morality is something about which there are no facts, this is a claim you are making. Widespread disagreement is not evidence that there are no facts. You have to explain why words don't mean what the fluent speakers of the language say they mean--how they have a secret philosophical true meaning. I hope at least that even though you still disagree you can get that you aren't really arguing, just stating basics with a heavy dose of implication.

At least then our posts will be shorter

I am opining that cultural perceptions create a multiplicity of views on a given subject, each derived by reasoning, but differentiated in their outcomes by the variables that are cultural values. Furthermore, I am saying that no single culture is more “correct” than another, as the measures of correctness are determined by that same culture’s values. Yes, this is self deterministic but unless you have recognition of shared values across cultures, there can be no mutually recognized comparison.

In the case of the holocaust, don't you think the victor has set the moral argument, and that had the victor been different, our views on the holocaust and Adolf might be rather different than despisal?
Speak for yourself

They would have to have a hardcore indoctrination program to achieve a significant amount of people around the world believing what they did wasn't wrong. You have a scary view of the power of culture over the human mind. Are my views about the hiroshima bombings set by the fact that the US was on the winning side? How about the bombings of dresden? Japanese internment camps? How does the world feel about that today?

I’m a little flabbergasted. Don’t you think openness, liberty and freedom for self analysis are cornerstones of western democratic culture? Might your world view and values not be different were you Iranian, Russian or Chinese?

Also, can’t you see how your own education from birth to adulthood is a (benign?) form of cultural indoctrination?

[Sasaki Kojiro]

My fundamental issue here is that you never bridge the gap between describing how different people disagree and concluding that there is no truth about the matter. It is as if I describe all the different views of whether the greeks attacked troy, and then conclude that there is no truth about whether they attacked troy. I would have a big gap in my argument, right? My point with most of that post is that the language you use gives the illusion of that gap being covered (e.g. "acceptable" states your conclusion but is barely different from "accepted" which is the description).

The question of whether morality is culturally determined you answer by defining morality as something that is culturally determined--you would say something like "these rules are an integral part of past societies, there are many different views". But that assumes a definition of morality to start with.

The only direct argument I remember you offering (apologies if I'm forgetting) was a kind of prudential, pragmatic argument that it is better to treat the moral beliefs of other cultures as equally valid so that we can understand and live together. But "it's better to treat" is not the same as "they are".

Your argument against moral facts is that there is no external scale, which is a decent argument I think. It certainly shows that some moral rules are relative. But it doesn't show that all are, or that the important ones are.

I'm objecting to your implied definition of morality. The words we have in our language that have to do with morality came into usage referring to something definite, not relative. It's fundamental to the definition of morality that it refers to facts. That is how we treat it and how we think about it, which is why people independently change their mind about what they believe is moral. And that's where the meaning of words come from. It is not something that can be changed on a whim. Up cannot mean down. I cannot define "my opinion" as "the truth" and then claim that because I believe something, it is true. I cannot say that a brave action is cowardly. And that is what relativism does with morals.

Understand that you can take a moral realist position, and argue that burkha's should not be banned (reenk made very good arguments in that fashion). And in fact if you don't adopt the moral realist position you cannot argue intelligibly against the ban. Because it would be belgium's culture in which it is then moral to ban the burkha. You would be reduced to saying "I don't like that, for no rational reason", or "bah!".

I just feel like the combination of the ambiguous language you use, the fact that some rules are different in different cultures, and the fact that you see it as the only way to treat other cultures with respect rather than being xenophobic is a very powerful bias for you towards a faulty philosophical position. But it's quite possible that you can argue coherently for every belief you have about other cultures from the moral realist position. Perhaps it is a moral truth that cultures must respect each other's rules 95% of the time, with exceptions for killing innocent children for fun, at which point they have an obligation to intervene.

[Fragony]

Ah there's my boy (our blonde fury) , Merkel hat angst. Of course, you don't try to destroy someone (Sarrazin) only to declare multiculturalism dead two weeks later, such 180's we call opportunism. The populist right can't be stopped you idiots nobody is buying the hypocrisy of such newly aquired insights. Besides it's bull I'm perfectly happy in my multcultural society we get along fine when the illusion of 100% succes isn't active policy, political correctness is dead rest in pieces, no thanks to you you plumb eastblock work-horse. Step aside we don't need you. When you declare something dead you admit it's existane, you go girl

Edit good show you two by the way, that's a gentleman's sport

[The Stranger]

@sasaki:

you ask all_p to explain why (and perhaps even prove that) there no moral facts. And while it is true that you cannot conclude from the empirical fact that people disagree about their moral beliefs that there are no objective moral facts (aka that there is no truth when it comes to morals) it is equally untrue that you can conclude from the empirical fact that people have moral beliefs (belief a to be good and b to be bad) that there are moral facts (that when person x beliefs a and person z beliefs b, and a and b contradict, that only one of them can be true). It is still the question whether the laws of logic apply to morals, because, amongst others, there is a possibility that morals are fundamentally illogical.

so my question to you is, please explain why you believe (and perhaps prove that) there are moral facts.

[The Stranger]

Ah there's my boy (our blonde fury) , Merkel hat angst. Of course, you don't try to destroy someone (Sarrazin) only to declare multiculturalism dead two weeks later, such 180's we call opportunism. The populist right can't be stopped you idiots nobody is buying the hypocrisy of such newly aquired insights. Besides it's bull I'm perfectly happy in my multcultural society we get along fine when the illusion of 100% succes isn't active policy, political correctness is dead rest in pieces, no thanks to you you plumb eastblock work-horse. Step aside we don't need you. When you declare something dead you admit it's existane, you go girl

Edit good show you two by the way, that's a gentleman's sport

actually not. when you declare something dead, you declare that it has existed, if you take it 100% serious. but what she probably does is declare the idea of multiculturalism dead, in the same way that people have declared the idea of god dead (they thereby did not admit that he had ever existed), they do admit that the idea has existed.

What she couldve done also is say that multiculturalism doesn't exist and has never existed, but that would make too many people angry :P so she slightly phrased it differently and said almost exactly the same (if multiculturalism has ever existed it doesnt exist anymore = multiculturalism is dead)

[Fragony]

When Nietszsche declared god dead it was a metaphore for the comming end of an era, he never believed in a god, it's the practise of worship that he declared dead. Such is the same here but Merkel deserves no credit for it she's an opportunist taking a populist stand for damage control.

[The Stranger]

When Nietszsche declared god dead it was a metaphore for the comming end of an era, he never believed in a god, it's the practise of worship that he declared dead. Such is the same here but Merkel deserves no credit for it she's an opportunist taking a populist stand for damage control.

so.. basically we say the same thing again only you have to add a (moral) judgment to the matter :P and cmon... declaring the death of ideas and such, everyone does it nowadays. art is dead, the artist is dead blablabla... its neither shocking nor innovating.

[Sasaki Kojiro]

@sasaki:

you ask all_p to explain why (and perhaps even prove that) there no moral facts. And while it is true that you cannot conclude from the empirical fact that people disagree about their moral beliefs that there are no objective moral facts (aka that there is no truth when it comes to morals) it is equally untrue that you can conclude from the empirical fact that people have moral beliefs (belief a to be good and b to be bad) that there are moral facts (that when person x beliefs a and person z beliefs b, and a and b contradict, that only one of them can be true). It is still the question whether the laws of logic apply to morals, because, amongst others, there is a possibility that morals are fundamentally illogical.

so my question to you is, please explain why you believe (and perhaps prove that) there are moral facts.

Because killing innocent children for fun is wrong, by the definition of "wrong". The analogy I would make is to say that there are facts about what color the sky is, because the sky is blue, by definition. There are not facts about how happy the sky is by contrast, because of what it is that the word "sky" refers to.

Well, it's a two part argument which I kind of jumbled together here. One part is a semantic argument, about whether moral statements are things that can be true or false. The other part is that some such statements are true, and I don't think that alh would disagree that my example is one of those true statements if they accepted the semantic part. Actually I really doubt that "whether there are moral facts" is what we are disagreeing about. I think it is whether any moral facts are universal, with alh claiming that in some cultures it would not be thought wrong to X, and then concluding that it isn't wrong to X in that culture. That relies upon a different definition of wrong.

I think your issue is a broader one of "when are we justified in believing something"? And arises similarly in response to other sophistical claims like "there is no mind independent world".

[The Stranger]

Because killing innocent children for fun is wrong, by the definition of "wrong". The analogy I would make is to say that there are facts about what color the sky is, because the sky is blue, by definition. There are not facts about how happy the sky is by contrast, because of what it is that the word "sky" refers to.

actually i disagree, for a few reasons. let me first start with the obvious and then work my way to the less obvious reason, which i also find hard to explain in english so i hope that you can forgive me if i make some mistakes or become incoherent.

1. it doesnt follow from the definition of the sky that it is blue. however there are facts about the color of the sky because it is a fact that the sky has a color. However in order to determine what color the sky has we have to go outside and determine the color. Therefore "the sky is blue" is a synthetic a fortiori statement. Unlike the statement that "all bachelors are unmarried" which is a analytic a priori statement because it adds no new information and we do not need experience to tell us that "all bachelors are in fact unmarried". These first type of facts are empirical facts, they are facts about the world and can be determined to be true or not only for so far they appear in the world. If there was no sky in the world, then it could not have a color, and it couldnt be blue. The second type of facts are a different type of facts, because even if the world would have no bachelors it would still be true that all bachelors are unmarried.

2. It doesnt follow from the definition of wrong that "killing innocent children for fun" is wrong. It follows from the definition of wrong that when you believe something to be wrong that you disagree with it. It follows from the definition of square that all sides are equal, and its interior angles are all right angles (90°). From this it follows that the opposite sides are also parallel. But nothing about the definition of square says that the square has to be blue. Yet it is a fact that there are squares which are blue, it is not a fact that all squares are blue. It follows from the definition of innocent that one who is innocent has done nothing evil/morally wrong, but if doesnt follow from the definition of innocent that it is wrong to kill someone who is innocent.

3. while it is a fact that there are people who believe that it is wrong to kill innocent children for fun, it doesnt follow from that that it is a fact that killing innocent children for fun is wrong.

analogy

it is a fact that people disagree about their morals, but it doesnt follow from that fact that it is also a (empirical, not to be mistaken with moral) fact that there are no (moral) facts in morals

analogy

you can not derive a moral rule from a empiral fact.

–adjective
1.
not in accordance with what is morally right or good: a wrong deed. (in this case something is "wrong" if it is not in accordance with one's morals, nothing about it states what these morals must be)
2.
deviating from truth or fact; erroneous: a wrong answer. (and again it doesnt say anything about "killing for fun is wrong".)

however i think what we need to establish first is this, in the case that there would be moral facts, what kind of facts would they be? most people would say that they are metaphysical facts, but perhaps you are a moral realist and you would say that they are empirical facts and they can be determined by experiment.

if you believe morals to be metaphysical you cant use the scientific method in order to determine whether one moral statement is wrong and the other is not. if you believe morals to be empirical than you can, but that gives rise to a whole different set of problems such as, how to we recognise moral facts etc etc

[Sasaki Kojiro]

I think you are right that I was misusing the phrase "...by definition". What I was trying to get at was this--when we first had the urge to call things wrong or immoral (and when we have it today) we have in mind something in the real world. If we were to win a race and the prize was given to someone else, we would call it unfair, and that's where the word comes from. That makes the meaning of "unfair" pretty solid. The person giving the prize would clearly by factually incorrect if they said "it may be "fair to you" that the fastest runner gets the 1st place prize, but according to me it is fair to give it to my son".

So what I was suggesting then was that "killing innocent children for fun" is a paradigm case of something that is wrong. Similar to how being burnt by fire is a paradigm case of something that is painful. That since our conception of pain and fairness and wrongness are built off of such cases, they have to be discussed in that framework. To do otherwise is use the same words but act like they refer to something different, which is why I said that about definition. And I think this shows that moral claims are things that can be true or false. What you are talking about is a different problem. For example, astrological claims are things that can be true or false, but they fail at being factual. So it becomes the much tougher question of when we are justified in believing something.

I don't think anyone would argue that we aren't justified in believing something is painful (even though some people may be tougher or less sensitive than others). But I think that is because it is not at all a confusing topic. Whereas morality is something that people can become confused about, and thus there is widespread disagreement. But I generally agree with the SEP's summary:

Some moral realists argue that the disagreements, widespread as they are, do not go very deep—that to a significant degree moral disagreements play out against the background of shared fundamental principles with the differences of opinion regularly being traceable to disagreements about the nonmoral facts that matter in light of the moral principles. On their view, the explanation of moral disagreements will be of a piece with whatever turns out to be a good explanation of the various nonmoral disagreements people find themselves in.

Other moral realists, though, see the disagreements as sometimes fundamental. On their view, while moral disagreements might in some cases be traceable to disagreements about nonmoral matters of fact, this will not always be true. Still, they deny the anti-realist's contention that the disagreements that remain are well explained by noncognitivism or by an error theory Instead, they regularly offer some other explanation of the disagreements. They point out, for example, that many of the disagreements can be traced to the distorting effects of the emotions, attitudes, and interests that are inevitably bound up with moral issues. Or they argue that what appear to be disagreements are really cases in which the people are talking past each other, each making claims that might well be true once the claims are properly understood (Harman 1975, Wong 1984). And they often combine these explanatory strategies holding that the full range of moral disagreements are well explained by some balanced appeal to all of the considerations just mentioned, treating some disagreements as not fundamentally moral, others as a reflection of the distorting effects of emotion and interest, and still others as being due to insufficiently subtle understandings of what people are actually claiming. If some combination of these explanations works, then the moral realist is on firm ground in holding that the existence of moral disagreements, such as they are, is not an argument against moral realism. Of course, if no such explanation works, then an appeal either to noncognitivism or an error theory (i.e. to some form of anti-realism) may be the best alternative.

however i think what we need to establish first is this, in the case that there would be moral facts, what kind of facts would they be? most people would say that they are metaphysical facts, but perhaps you are a moral realist and you would say that they are empirical facts and they can be determined by experiment.

I'm afraid I can't answer this properly. It's a difficult question, compared to moral realism which can be arrived at merely by rejecting sophistry. I think W.D. Ross gave a good description of how we acquire moral knowledge:

That our responsibilities are self-evident does not entail that they are obvious to everyone who reflects on them. Ross maintains that a responsibility is self-evident ‘not in the sense that it is evident from the beginning of our lives, or as soon as we attend to the proposition for the first time, but in the sense that when we have reached sufficient mental maturity and have given sufficient attention to the proposition it is evident without any need of proof, or of evidence beyond itself. It is self-evident just as a mathematic axiom, or the validity of a form of inference, is evident’ (RG 29; also 12, 32). The analogy with mathematics is instructive, for we acquire our moral knowledge in the same way we acquire knowledge of mathematical axioms. We apprehend that 2+2 = 4 by apprehending that 2+2 matches makes 4 matches and that 2+2 balls makes 4 balls, and so on. We apprehend the algorithm in the particular cases after repeated exposure to particular instances of its application, by a process of intuitive induction (FE 170). We apprehend that it is prima facie right to keep promises by apprehending that it is prima facie right to fulfill this or that particular promise. ‘What comes first in time is the apprehension of the self-evident prima facie rightness of an individual act of a particular type. From this we come by reflection to apprehend the self-evident general principle of prima facie duty’ (RG 33; also FE 170).

But in general it's a complicated subject that's a little beyond me. But I find the practical theory's like ross's and aristotle's virtue ethics far more sensible and genuine than many other attempts which are often biased, sophist, or attempt to be too systemized.

*************

On a personal aside from the argument, I doubt the sincerity of people who claim they don't think "killing innocent children for fun is wrong" is factual, and that we are justified in believing it.

[The Stranger]

it is indeed a difficult topic, and since i have serious trouble making correct and meaningfull phrases in english about it i think i will let it rest for now. perhaps ill try to write an essay about it :)

thank you for your response!

[Sasaki Kojiro]

I have trouble making the correct phrases in english too

[al Roumi]

Firstly, thanks for your patience Sasaki –I was away for a long weekend without the time to give this a proper answer/thought. I think it’s fair to point at a couple of assumptions in my argument, I’ll try to delve into them now.

I agree that a simple disagreement or difference of opinion doesn’t mean that both parties are right. However, I do think that when the valuation of what is right is subjective, that neither party can claim to be right over the other.

This is where my point regarding cultural values defining some aspects of morality comes in. I completely agree that morality is generated by experience and rationalising, but I do maintain that there is room for culture and ideology to play a part in these experience and rationality.

Abstaining from causing various forms of harm to “thy neighbour” seems to be a near universal moral, but when we look at things where the definition of harm varies –or where there are multiple and alternative “harms” consequent of the initial dilemma or circumstance, “moral” individuals will knowingly perpetuate systems and actions which cause harm for the greater good.

It is this kind of situation, of far greater complexity and consequence than “x harms y therefore x is wrong/bad/immoral”, that I have been referring to in our discussion.

To give you an example: As we might say the west values liberty and freedom of expression above all, some cultures value tradition and respectfulness above all. These are not equal or opposite sets of values, but they have some areas of mutual agreement, as well as contradiction. So, as the west claims it is vital that women are treated equally to men, other cultures might agree that women should be treated fairly, but without undermining their patriarchal social norms –hence not actually treating women equally to men. I know which view I agree with more, but I cannot say which view is, in an absolute sense, correct or wrong either.

What would actually make one wrong and the other right? A comparative Marxist/materialist view of a society's productivity? Surely one gauges or measures the worth of each position according to one’s personal scale/view. This subjective scale is, IMO, itself defined by what one values - hence westerners valuing outcomes according to the degree of liberty and equality and others according to the degree of tradition and respectfulness. This is circular reasoning, but I would venture that this circularity is actually why the talking past each other happens.

How can we objectively measure (the cornerstone of moral realism afaik from wikipedia) the outcomes when the criteria by which the outcomes are appreciated are subjective? Until one can transcend these cultural or personal values and propose a solution of objective, independent or mutually understandable worth, neither party will see eye to eye.

[gaelic cowboy]

I have trouble making the correct phrases in english too

Tommy Tiernan summed it up best here

"The English language is like a brick wall between me and you, and is my chisel" (insert common Irish swear word)

[Sasaki Kojiro]

As I said in my reply to stranger, it is hard to say what exactly the basis for morality is, and it is often difficult to argue for one moral position over the other. The good thing about multiculturalism is that it acknowledges this, and is thus an improvement over the idea it largely replaced. But it should only acknowledge that it is difficult. It is not that neither party can claim to be right, it is that they cannot merely claim to be right, they must try and show that they are right.

I don't think though, that valuation of what is right is subjective. It is not a matter of arbitrary taste. And I think if we look at the differences in rules, we will see that they are not based on differences in taste. It is wrong to not tip your bartender in America, but not wrong in England (as I understand it). But we would not conclude that whether one should tip is subjective. In America the hourly wage for a bartender is very low, and tips are supposed to make up the difference. In England that's not the case. On the surface it looks like a difference but underneath it's the same principle.

My values are things that can be distorted and wrong. This is something that has to be admitted. Someone who is extremely selfish values their own wallet over the person who's car the just hit before driving off. There's no subjectivity there--they are wrong. "Values" is a word that I think confuses. It kind of begs the question. My "values" are not necessarily to be "valued". They are not necessarily worth anything. If I am extremely selfish, they are bad values.

I would extend that to the culture that values having women be servile. If you look at all the things that go into backing up their moral beliefs, I think you would reject many of them. Selfishness on the part of the men, and fear on the part of the women, for example. How is it a matter of taste?

And even when I am earnest and well meaning in my moral beliefs, I can be wrong and would admit it if I could be shown how. I may believe that X results in Y when it does not. I may not have any personal experience with something, and therefore not add enough weigh to it in my evaluation. I may have an underlying bias due to the way the idea was first presented to me--perhaps it is something I was taught while young and never questioned.

I acknowledge that there is a certain amount of variation. I think how much we value security has a window of subjectivity, for example. There are genetic differences that have to do with that. But then I don't think the value of acknowledging and working with such legitimate subjective ranges is itself subjective.

Frankly I think that multiculturalism, in its combat with xenophobia, has taken to leaning on the "values are subjective" type of argument as a crutch. If you are arguing with a xenophobe it's natural to avoid exposing yourself by making difficult arguments about the basis of morality, and trying to figure out and judge what all the causes of disagreement are. It's difficult but it's better to do it, because we will get closer to the truth that way. If someone is arguing against Mexicans bringing their culture here, we should be able to do more than say that it is subjective whether their culture is bad. That grants equal legitimacy to the xenophobe. We should instead be able to argue that it is good.

[Beskar]

I don't think though, that valuation of what is right is subjective. It is not a matter of arbitrary taste. And I think if we look at the differences in rules, we will see that they are not based on differences in taste. It is wrong to not tip your bartender in America, but not wrong in England (as I understand it). But we would not conclude that whether one should tip is subjective. In America the hourly wage for a bartender is very low, and tips are supposed to make up the difference. In England that's not the case. On the surface it looks like a difference but underneath it's the same principle.

Everyone and everything wants a tip in America.

In England, everyone gets a good wage, and even then, we only tip 10% if the meal is good in a restaurant. That tip goes towards a bonus for all the staff, as the 'waiter/waitress' is only giving you a plate, it was the cook in the back which is doing the meal. You pay for what you ordered and you pay for everything, no hidden costs.

In America, random person opens door, then opens their hand. You are expected and pretty much "have" to tip or they go into an infernal rage. Even worse when they just take your money and they don't even give you your change, or even when you tip them, they cry about how you didn't tip them enough.

Then there is full of hidden costs. I remember using an American tour company for a holiday, they had so many hidden costs, it was unbelievable. It turns out they don't even pay the bus driver or the tour guide and you are expected to pay their entire wage in tips. What kind of barmy system is that? When I pay for something, I expect to have paid for it. I don't budget for random throwing money at my wallet at people. They got in a rage when they only got £200 in tips, £200 is a lot of money, and they were wanting like £500-700.

(Oh and that Tour Company wasn't cheap itself either. What on earth did they do with the money that we had to pay them? Line their back pockets with it?)

[Fragony]

so.. basically we say the same thing again only you have to add a (moral) judgment to the matter :P and cmon... declaring the death of ideas and such, everyone does it nowadays. art is dead, the artist is dead blablabla... its neither shocking nor innovating.

I didn't say anything, just explaing what others said.

[Sasaki Kojiro]

Everyone and everything wants a tip in America.

In England, everyone gets a good wage, and even then, we only tip 10% if the meal is good in a restaurant. That tip goes towards a bonus for all the staff, as the 'waiter/waitress' is only giving you a plate, it was the cook in the back which is doing the meal. You pay for what you ordered and you pay for everything, no hidden costs.

You take a 5$ drink, make it 4$, and then the customer pays the extra 1$ only if the drink isn't bungled. Downside is that company is tempted to up the price, upside is that you get better service.

[Tellos Athenaios]

That's not how it works in the USA though. In the USA you pay for the drink, you don't pay for the waiter. So leaving without a tip is equivalent to not paying the waiter, basically.
In the UK/Netherlands/Germany/France/Belgium it's more like you pay for both, but if the waiter/house are any good it is custom to leave a tip; tips are pooled and divided according to some scheme among staff. So a venue where both quality and service of the product is top notch sees a generous additional income for its staff meaning an incentive for all concerned to do their best and more business (profit) for the venue too.

[The Stranger]

lets determine a few things.

1. If morals were objective this would mean that some people would be right in their moral beliefs and others wrong (since it is a known fact that some people have conflicting or even contradicting morals). However, even if it would be true that morals are objective, we have no way to find out which belief is objectively right and which one is objectively wrong.

2. The fact that we have no means to determine the truth of moral beliefs doesn't automatically entails that moral beliefs are (entirely) subjective, but it does make it more likely than if we had a method. The fact that people disagree about their morals doesn't mean that there is no truth in morals. However, accordingly the fact that certain people have similar morals doesnt mean that there is a universal truth in morals. We also need to remember that just because things are a certain way it doesnt mean it ought to be that way.

3. What needs to be established is the realm in which morals belong. Are they empiric statements? Are they taste judgments? Are they judgments of reason and ratio?


i also think that we need to take less drastic examples. Fur or No Fur? Who is right? And why? Are the people who object to fur on moral grounds right and all those people who have lived in the centuries before them wrong? How can we establish such a thing?

[Furunculus]

You take a 5$ drink, make it 4$, and then the customer pays the extra 1$ only if the drink isn't bungled. Downside is that company is tempted to up the price, upside is that you get better service.

don't want decent service, i want a hassle-free drink.

[Rhyfelwyr]

I've never seen my parents tip anyway. Heh, don't mind us miserly Scots, we're worse than the Jews!

I've heard there is a saying on the continent that when something is unfairly priced, it's known as Scots-price or something like that. Does such a saying exist?

[gaelic cowboy]

You take a 5$ drink, make it 4$, and then the customer pays the extra 1$ only if the drink isn't bungled. Downside is that company is tempted to up the price, upside is that you get better service.

I drank in a place where drink was free in Iowa IIRC it was in Cedar Rapids, you had to tip the bartender but twas all free I thinkit was called Drunken Monkey or summit.

When I got home no one would believe me this place existed it just seemed to fantastic like a magical gumdrop land with chocolate houses and all.

If it was not for the Atlantic and another few hours driving from Chicago there would be planeloads of Irish intent on seeing the delights of Iowa.

[Sasaki Kojiro]

lets determine a few things.

1. If morals were objective this would mean that some people would be right in their moral beliefs and others wrong (since it is a known fact that some people have conflicting or even contradicting morals). However, even if it would be true that morals are objective, we have no way to find out which belief is objectively right and which one is objectively wrong.

2. The fact that we have no means to determine the truth of moral beliefs ...

It's true that objective morality doesn't entail us being able to figure it out. But why do you say we have no way to find out? I think it's at least as tough to claim that it's a fact that we can't determine the truth of a belief as it is to claim that a basic moral (like murder) is factual.

3. What needs to be established is the realm in which morals belong. Are they empiric statements? Are they taste judgments? Are they judgments of reason and ratio?

The basics are self evident given adequate reasoning ability and information, and a person who is looking for a fact about it and not trying to grind an axe.

i also think that we need to take less drastic examples. Fur or No Fur? Who is right? And why? Are the people who object to fur on moral grounds right and all those people who have lived in the centuries before them wrong? How can we establish such a thing?

Well is a less drastic example the same as a more ambiguous example? How about, say, I promise to pick you up somewhere and then don't because I was watching a mildly amusing tv show.

But the animal rights movement is based in part on empirical claims about animal cognition. And the argument against fur would have to go further and show that the people wearing it were somehow immorally ignorant.

[The Stranger]

It's true that objective morality doesn't entail us being able to figure it out. But why do you say we have no way to find out? I think it's at least as tough to claim that it's a fact that we can't determine the truth of a belief as it is to claim that a basic moral (like murder) is factual.



The basics are self evident given adequate reasoning ability and information, and a person who is looking for a fact about it and not trying to grind an axe.




Well is a less drastic example the same as a more ambiguous example? How about, say, I promise to pick you up somewhere and then don't because I was watching a mildly amusing tv show.

But the animal rights movement is based in part on empirical claims about animal cognition. And the argument against fur would have to go further and show that the people wearing it were somehow immorally ignorant.

Untill we find a way to refute Hume's sceptiscism i think we can safely say that we have not found a way yet.

[Sasaki Kojiro]

Untill we find a way to refute Hume's sceptiscism i think we can safely say that we have not found a way yet.

I disagree and if I recall correctly hume was not as insistent on skepticism as many people who use his argument are. Basically lack of absolute certainty is only a problem if only absolute certainty will do. In other words if I can only be as sure that X is immoral as I am that sticking my hand in the fire will hurt, then alright.

[The Stranger]

well hume was aware that radical skeptiscism is highly unpractical, and therefor not useable in day to day life. but were now discussing the absolutes, the foundations of our morals and then i think we should take his skeptiscism into account.

[Sasaki Kojiro]

well hume was aware that radical skeptiscism is highly unpractical, and therefor not useable in day to day life. but were now discussing the absolutes, the foundations of our morals and then i think we should take his skeptiscism into account.

In what way aren't we taking it into account?

[Rhyfelwyr]

Diversity festival to accompany 2-minute silence.

Fury! Outrage! Clash of civilizations! Send them all home!